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EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION
The relation between concepts and perception has been a central issue in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science for a few decades,
and it has recently been rejuvenated by research on concept empiricism
and on cognitive penetration. Research on the relation between concepts and perception in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences focuses
on several distinct issues. Of particular interest are the following three:
• What is the content of perceptual states? Some philosophers of
mind (e.g., John McDowell) argue that the content of perception
is conceptual, while others (e.g., Gareth Evans) insist that it is
non-conceptual. Still others philosophers, such as Robert Stalnaker, have raised questions about the very terms of this debate.
• Is perception cognitively penetrable? In the 1950’s and 1960’s New
Look psychologists defended the view that beliefs and desires directly influence perception, a view that came under attack in the
1970s. In his book on modularity, Fodor enshrined what had then
become a consensus in cognitive science: Perception cannot be
penetrated by mental states outside of perceptual systems.
• Are concepts amodal? Empiricists, such as David Hume and John
Locke, traditionally held that concepts are stored records of perceptual states. In contrast, amodal theorists (such as Jerry Fodor)
hold that concepts are represented in a format that is distinct from
the format of perceptions.
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These long-standing controversies continue to animate debates in
philosophy and cognitive science. Since the 1990s, a group of psychologists (e.g., Lawrence Barsalou, Arthur Glenberg, Michael Kashak, Diane Pecher, René Zeelenberg, Rolf Zwaan), neuroscientists (e.g., Alex
Martin, Friedemann Pulvermüller), and philosophers (e.g., Jesse Prinz)
have defended, theoretically and experimentally, contemporary versions
of empiricism, and evidence seems to have accumulated in support of
a form of Neo-Empiricism. For instance, actions seem to interfere with
our capacity to entertain concepts, while thinking about colors elicits
activation in or near brain areas involved in color perception. Some
philosophers (e.g., Guy Dove, Edouard Machery) and cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Marina Bedny, Alfonson Caramazza, Bradford Mahon,
Rebecca Saxe) disagree. At the same time, research in social psychology
(e.g., Emily Balcetis, Dennis Proffitt) has provided some striking novel
evidence suggesting that beliefs and goals influence the content and
phenomenology of experience. According to experimental reports, people perceive a slope as more slanted when they wear a heavy backpack,
and their experience of a fruit (for instance, of a banana) is influenced
by their knowledge of its typical color. Philosophers have picked up on
this New New Look in psychology to defend the cognitive penetrability of perception (e.g., Susanna Siegel, Fiona Macpherson, Jesse Prinz,
Duston Stokes, Wayne Wu). There too, the debate is raging: Some
psychologists (Chaz Firestone, Brian Scholl) and philosophers (Ophelia Deroy, Steven Gross, Edouard Machery) demur.
In light of these recent developments, we (Edouard Machery and
Jesse Prinz) felt that time had come to convene a conference on the relation between concepts and perception in order to assess the on-going
controversies. This project led to the 9 th International Symposium of
Cognition, Logic and Communication held at the Center for Cognitive
Sciences and Semantics in Riga, Latvia in June 2013. Many of the most
active contributors to the recent debates attended this conference — including David Chalmers, Alva Noë, Fiona Macpherson, Ruth Millikan,
Steve Gross, Michael Devitt, Kathleen Akins, Andy Clark, Rob Goldstone, Casey O’Callaghan, and Diane Pecher — and numerous excellent contributed papers were submitted. This Symposium was an unmitigated success, and we need to thank the local organizers for their
work: Jurǵis Šķilters, Signe Mežinska, Kristı̄ne Ante, Signe Cāne, Lı̄va
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Brice, Lı̄va Raita, Jānis Pencis, Marta Selecka, Krista Leškēviča, Signe
Sproǵe, Andrejs Vojevoda. We would also like to thank the rector of
the University of Latvia, Prof. Mārcis Auziņš for his support. In this 9 th
volume of The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and
Communication, we present a selection of invited and contributed papers that were given at this remarkable symposium.
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